In a quest to examine the nature of the soul, Aristotle
utilizes valuable philosophical principles to comprehensively account for what
he views are the characteristics of the soul.
For Aristotle the soul is the essence of a living thing; this notion is
fundamentally different then the accounts that conceive of the soul as some
sort of substance occupying the body, existing separately and eternally. According to Aristotle the soul contributes
what is necessary to facilitate the organism actualizing its potential for life. That is the soul is responsible for numerous
activities that are part of the essential nature of that specific type of
being. Certain basic principles of
Aristotelian philosophical theories are utilized, including Hylomorphism, potentiality
and actuality, and his four causes. Aristotle provides his account in his De Anima. In this paper I will analyze
his notion of the soul as described in De
Anima, recounting how he came to define the soul, the explanation of the
why the soul came to be, how the souls of different kinds of ensouled beings
differ, and his unique concept of how the soul and body depend on each other
for self actualization. Furthermore I
will juxtapose Aristotle’s account with a traditionally Jewish explication of
the essential nature of the soul.
Aristotle begins Book 1 of De Anima by setting out his project to map out the characteristics
of the soul. Postulating an accurate
description of the essential nature of the soul was beyond the scope of the
project. In unfolding the nature of the
soul, it is possible to determine which attributes belong to the soul alone and
which belong to the organism in virtue of having a soul (Aristotle, De Anima). In
total Aristotle set out to explore the nature of life, determine whether all
mental states (of the soul) are also material states of the body, or whether
some attributes of the soul are unique to it. This account ultimately elicit interesting
implications on the mind/body problem and leads to a specific understanding of
the relationship between the two entities, to which I will get to later on.
What
is the soul according to Aristotle?
Aristotle starts his investigation by use of his
explanatory theory of Hylomorphism. This
theory states that substances are compounds of matter and form, and change occurs when form
actualizes matter (Shields). There are three sorts of substances; form, matter,
and the compound of form and matter. Matter is potentiality and form is
actuality. Form actualizes matter, which possesses the potential to be what it
is. So using Aristotle’s example of a bronze statue, the matter, in this case
the matter bronze, only actualizes it’s potential of being a statue when it
acquires the form, or the shape and features. Of interest is the third kind of
substance, compounds, which are the class of substances that make up living
beings. The physical body is the matter
and the soul is form or shape. This is Aristotle’s preliminary definition of
the soul as the actuality of a natural body having life potentially (Aristotle,
De Anima). By virtue of being in this form, a body and soul compound, an
organism is can be alive. Without the soul, the body would only have the capacity
for life potentially, and so the soul is the essence (the form) of living
things.
This preliminary definition becomes more nuanced when
Aristotle identifies the soul as the “first
actuality of a natural body that is potentially alive” (Aristotle, De Anima). He likens the actuality ability the soul
possesses to the actuality that is knowledge, in that we speak of it in two
ways. This will lead to two notions of
actuality. We can distinguish between a state of knowing x and a state of
attending to the knowledge of x, where the latter is more of an active process.
The passive state of knowing x is the first actuality. Appropriately titled, as this notion of
knowing necessarily comes prior to the active process of recalling that
knowledge. This is analogous to the soul
of a sleeping person, the first actuality, whereas the soul of an awake person
is like the active state. The soul must be the first actuality, for if not we would
be forced to say a sleeping animal lacks a soul, a conclusion we do not want to
make (Aristotle, De Anima). An important characteristic of the first actuality
is it the fact that it holds the capacity to engage in the activity of the
second actuality, and in this way is has potential to exercise some function,
like the ability to engage in thought. Aristotle
makes this clear when he states that, “If the eye, for instance, were an animal,
sight would be its soul” (Aristotle, De Anima). Sight is the capacity of the
eye for seeing, and therefore the first actuality, and seeing is the second
actuality. According to Aristotle the
formula for vitality is the function actively exercising the potential ability.
So it seems that beyond defining the soul as the ‘first actuality of a natural
body that is potentially alive’, we can say the soul instantiates a set of
capacities that render beings living. Different beings require unique characteristics;
from this Aristotle creates his hierarchy of ensouled beings or the degrees of
souls. I will return to this distinction later in this paper.
To this point an account of how Aristotle explicates
the components of the soul has been provided.
However this is insufficient, the definition just given explains the what, but a full account must explain
the why. In order to provide a
comprehensive account, one that is sufficient for knowledge, Aristotle utilizes
the notions of causation and explanation to theorize further on the nature of
the soul. The four causes include the material cause, formal cause, efficient
cause, and final cause. Material cause is what something is made of, the formal
cause is the form or pattern of which a thing is what it is, the efficient
cause refers to the agent of change or rest, and the final cause is the
intended purpose of the change or the reason why a thing is done (Shields). We
must, therefore, determine why the soul is what it is in virtue of these four
general causes.
The
soul is the principle and the cause of the living body, for it is in virtue of
the soul that the body is alive, and thus it plays an explanatory role. It is
the cause of the living body in three of the four ways, as “the source of
motion, as what something is for, and as the substance of ensouled bodies” (Aristotle),
corresponding to the efficient cause, the final cause, and the formal cause
respectively. It is the source of motion in that it causes growth and degeneration
in the organism. The soul is also the cause of the living body by virtue of
being the final cause, as the body is merely an organ for the sake of the soul,
aimed at the soul. And finally, the soul is the formal cause of the living body
for it causes life by being the form and actuality of what is potentially. The
body makes up the fourth cause, the material cause, by being the matter that
makes up a living organism (Aristotle, De Anima). It is by aligning his account with these four
principles that he makes the mind/body inextricable.
Aristotle uses an example of the nature of a house to
discuss the importance of form. Form
follows function. Defining a house merely as stones, bricks, and timbers fails
to capture its full essence. A house is stones, bricks, and timbers (material
cause), built into an enclosed structure (formal cause), fashioned together by
a carpenter (efficient cause), in order to provide shelter from the elements
(final cause). We can describe the what,
but without further details about the explanation, we don’t really know the nature of a house. Similarly the
soul is why, it gives the explanation
for, the life activities of a living body. At this point Aristotle’s notion of
the soul is quite comprehensive; it is the first actuality of a natural body
that is potentially alive, it is a set of capacities for life-giving and
defining activities of organisms, and it is the form, the source of motion, and
the means (it directs) to the end of the living body.
Faculties
of the Soul
Souls of different living beings are differentiated
by their capacities to engage in the activities characteristic of that type of organism.
It is these differentiating faculties that make up the soul. Among these
faculties are the nutritive and reproductive, perceptive, locomotive, and the
capacity for thought and understanding. Aristotle claims, “the soul is the
principle of the potentialities we have mentioned—for nutrition, perception,
understanding, and motion—and is defined by them” (Aristotle, De Anima). There
are three types of souls, arranged in a nested hierarchy. This means that possession of a higher-level soul
entails possession of all that are below it. The lowest, or most basic, in this
hierarchy is the nutritive soul. All living things possess the capacity for
self-nourishment, for without this they would not live. Next is the sensitive
soul, which is the highest type of soul possessed by animals. The highest type
of soul is the rational soul, belonging only to humans. These three souls are
differentiated by their function. Their function depends on its correspondence
with a specific ensouled being. While the animal soul possesses the nutritive
and the sensitive, and the human soul the rational as well, each has but one
unified soul with a various sets of capacities (Shields).
The nutritive soul is the
potentiality held by all living things to sustain life. The function of this
soul is the use of nourishment and generation, or reproduction. Generation is
the most natural function, as it is a means for a living being to participate
in the future (the “everlasting and divine”) by producing something else of its
own sort. The use of nourishment allows the being to preserve itself, only
existing while it is nourished. Nourishment allows an organism to grow as well
as decay, according to its form. Since all living things possess the nutritive
soul, all living things have the capacity for self-nourishment, growth, decay,
and for reproduction. Further, since all nourishment involves digestion, and
digestion involves heat, all beings contain heat (Aristotle, De Anima).
The sensitive, or perceptive soul, is what distinguishes
plants from animals. Perception is a type of alteration, in that a suitable sense
organ in perception is affected or changed by an external object. The external
object acts as the agent, possessing the qualities in actuality that the sense
organ possesses potentially. The relationship between the agents and the sense
organ utilizes an intermediate condition, such as air, to provide the forms or
qualities of the objects of perception, not the matter, when involuntarily
acted upon by the external object. Thus, the sensitive soul has the capacity to
receive sensible forms, resulting in perception. The sense organs become like
the agent after being affected, or receiving the qualities (Shields). Again, we
can see Aristotle returning to his theory of Hylomorphism in describing
perception as the change in the sense organ as a result of the acquisition of
form. The potential of the sense organ is made actual in virtue of the external
object that possesses the form in actuality.
While both animals and humans possess a nutritive and
a sensitive soul, there are various degrees of complexity of the latter soul
corresponding to the activities of the animal. Aristotle continues further that
the possession of the perceptive soul implies that the animal has the capacity
to desire, and desiring includes appetite, emotion, and wish. He also
determines possession of this soul entails the ability to feel pleasure and
pain and it is in virtue of this soul that some animals possess the power of
locomotion (Aristotle, De Anima).
The
Soul; What is Uniquely Human
The rational soul is the unique property of humans. It is in virtue of the rational soul that
intellect can function to acquire knowledge. The process of thinking is like
the process of perception, it depends on the reception of form by a suitable
capacity. However, while the object of perception is external and is the
composite of form and matter, the object of thought is within the soul and is
form alone (Shields). The objects of thought are forms of the external forms,
they are processes into their intelligible forms in virtue of the sensible
forms sensed in perception. Aristotle discusses the concept of “appearances”,
which are different from perceptions and beliefs, for appearances exist while
we sleep, with no external stimuli actualizing the ‘sensation’, and beliefs
involve conviction, while appearances do not. Appearances are images resembling
objects of perception (Aristotle, De Anima). In intellection, the mind is made
to be like the object of thought through reception of its intelligible form.
The intellect is pure potentiality, it potentially has all of these objects of
thought, and only in thought do these intelligible forms become actualized in
the mind (Shields).
Aristotle’s philosophical worldview rests on a
Hylomorphic principle, yet it remains to be seen how the alteration, bringing
the intellect from potentiality to actuality in thought, can occur. In
perception, this is in virtue of an external object that acts as an agent for
change in the sense-organ. But what is the agent of change in intellection? Aristotle
divides the intellect into the active and passive intellects. The active
intellect acts as the agent of change; when the mind thinks the active
intellect actualizes the intelligible forms in the passive intellect. The
passive intellect stores the concepts of knowledge and intelligible forms in
potentiality, to be recalled by the active intellect during thought. This means
however, that the actual must precede the potential, contrary to what was
discussed above. The nature of the active intellect is its activity, so it must
be constantly active in order to cause the passive intellect to act and us to
have thoughts and reason. If it is unremittingly active, this part of the
rational soul must be eternal and thus stands in stark contrast with the rest
of the souls Aristotle posits, but this controversial point is something I will
not take up in this paper (Shields).
The Alternative Theological Account (Judaism)
Aristotle’s
account of the soul limits itself to commons sense constraints. The soul functions as a mechanism for bodies
to instantiate what is required for them to be alive. While in some places Aristotle’s account is
nothing more then conjecture, it is responsible in that it appeals to a more
apparent pragmatic role or description.
The Jewish account of the soul, and many theological accounts need not
be restricted by such heuristic. The
role of the soul with regard to the physical space it occupies, namely a
being’s body, is the same in both accounts.
The physical body has the potential for life and depends on the soul to
actualize its potential. Like Aristotle,
this account believes that there are levels to the complexity of the souls of
different species. Judaism extends this
understanding by postulating that every entity possesses a soul. This is because the soul represents the
contribution of Godliness that every thing requires in order to exist. It is the mode for instantiating life, but it
also is the reason for beings or entities to exist, to serve the soul.
Like
Aristotle Judaism purports that humans have the most complex soul. While the human soul is the most complex it
also differs from the less complex souls in its ability to actualize a ‘higher
level’ of potentiality that is inaccessible for animals. There are five parts of the human soul. The Jewish Sages explain, “She is called by
five names: Nefesh (soul), Ruach (spirit), Neshamah (breath), Chayah (life),
and Yechidah (singularity)” (Midrash Rabbah).
These five names represent the five levels of the soul. Nefesh is the aspect of the soul that which
sustains life (i.e. the motor of a car sustains movement). The Ruach is the aspect of the soul that
makes the human the unique human that it is by providing the emotional aspect
of the personality. The Chaya portion is
responsible for the will and commitment to faith. Lastly the Yechidah portion is the essence of
the soul in that it represents the body’s connection to God through the
soul. The soul is a medium for the body
and God to be unified. These five
dimensions are parts of two larger distinctions for which could describe the
soul. The “Animal Soul” is mechanism
that motivates self-preservation and self-enhancement. The “Godly Soul” is the motivation to
maintain the unity with The Source.
While the interplay of these two aspects of the soul represent the human
struggle between physical needs and desires versus spiritual aspirations they
should not be viewed as contesting one another.
The Animal Soul encapsulates the Godly Soul and the physical body
encloses the Animal Soul. This structure
emphasizes the notion that all parts of any being depends on maintain a
connection with God. What is unique
about the human connection to God is the nature of the human being depended on
the characteristics God provided the human being. By imparting characteristics of God into the
soul, and by virtue of human beings having the soul influence their nature
humans have a unique capability when compared to all other entities. The soul allows humans to transcend the
physical self and act upon its
environment and not be constrained to acting as part of its natural environment.
This function is paralleled in the capabilities of God. The soul was created first and then imbued
within a physical body. In the physical
world the soul is challenged by the natural elements and apparently conflicting
needs of the Animal soul. This however
is the ambition, to actualize the diving essence in this arena of hidden truth.
In order to accomplish that task the soul comes with an instruction manual as
well as sustenance and energy to facilitate the completion of the goal by the
physical body. The Torah, or the Bible,
serves both of these roles simultaneously.
The Torah stipulates certain deeds that could be accomplished in the
physical world in order to bring more of the divine presence to the physical
realm. This is an example of the
relationship the physical world has with human beings. While it seems as though there are wants and
desires of the Animal Soul that do not adhere to the wants and desires of the
Divine contribution, these deeds stipulated in The Torah demonstrate how to
reconcile both aspects of the soul. Ultimately
when the physical aspect of the being has diminished only the soul remains in
its purely spiritual state; that is sans physical compartment. The deeds that have been accomplished in the
physical world facilitate the soul’s ascent.
Ultimately the soul will rejoin with its physical partner in the
Messianic Era. This is the final stage
of existence. In the World to Come, “The
entirety of creation will fully and uninhibitedly reflect the infinity and
perfection of its Creator, and physical components will transcend their
restricted nature in this world.” The physical body will fulfill its role yet
again but without the physical constraints of which it had previously been
restricted.
The implications of De Anima and Aristotle’s larger
philosophical framework allow us to formulate and analyze his notion of the
soul in terms of the mind/body problem. This account addresses the mind/body
problem implicitly. Though this was not
the outright goal of his project how he would address the problem becomes
obvious once he espouses the nature of the soul. Substance dualism is the
position that the mind is separate from the body and that the mind is
non-physical, often posited as being eternal. Aristotle’s provides an account of
the soul that it is not ontologically
distinct from the body. All nourishment, perception, and even thinking require
a body. Further, as the living body is
the composite of form (soul) and matter (body), it represents one inextricable
substance. While we can conceptually distinguish between a soul and a body, or
form and matter, they are but one substance, related in terms of this
composite. So when the body perishes, the soul does as well. Aristotle cannot
be said to be a substance dualist. Materialism, on the other hand, claims that
all that exists is physical and that substance is pure matter. But as has been
said, Aristotle’s position on the soul takes it to be pure form and thus
immaterial. The primary substance of a living body is the unity of body and
soul, which is not purely matter. Aristotle is not a materialist. Aristotle provided
an interesting framework for analyzing the mind/body problem. As opposed to presupposing the mind and
speculating on the body as dualists do, or vice versa if you are a materialist,
identifying the two as a unit and illuminating the association in terms of
unity relations may prove to facilitate understanding of the nature of the
soul.
Aristotle’s account of the nature of
the soul renders the soul and the physical body as incompatible without the
other component. The account stipulates that the soul and the body depend on
each other to actualize their role. As
compatible role-playing components of a being, the soul and the body can be
analyzed independently of each other only for intellectual pursuit but as
Aristotle explains each is rendered impotent without the existence of its
counterpart.
To summarize, Aristotle’s notion of
the soul is that it is the first actuality of a natural body that is
potentially alive. First actuality is the capacity for undertaking the action
that characterizes the second actuality. So the soul is life-giving and
facilitates the body for undertaking the actions necessary for survival and
well-being. Plants are limited with only the nutritive soul, enabling them to
sustain themselves and reproduce. Animals have this soul in addition to the
sensitive soul, which facilitates perception and feelings of pleasure, pain,
desire, appetite, etc. Humans contain all previous souls but are distinguished by
having a rational soul, which gives us the unique power of understanding,
thought, and rationality. Aristotle’s soul is unlike other conceptions as it
posits that although the body and soul is one, inseparable unit, the soul is
immaterial while the body is physical. He maintains a consistent approach when
analyzing the soul from his previous accounts of nature and reality by making
use of his broader theories of Hylomorphism, his four causes, and the
potential/actual nature of everything that exists, making for a impressively
cohesive portfolio.
Works Cited
1. Cohen, S. Marc., and
Patricia Curd. "De Anima." Readings in Ancient Greek
Philosophy: From Thales to Aristotle. 4th ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub.,
1995. 847-69. Print.
3. Shields, Christopher.
"Aristotle's Psychology." (Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy). N.p., 23 Aug. 2010. Web. 20 Dec. 2012.
4. Tauber, Yanki. "What Is
a Soul?" Life & Death. N.p., n.d. Web.
5. Midrash Rabbah. Bereishit 14:9 Print.
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